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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
BEVERLY KAY CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
ALFRED BRENT CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
---0000000---
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 16459 
Plaintiff Beverly Kay Christensen (hereinafter 
"Mrs. Christensen") commenced Civil Action Number 239969 
(hereinafter "the civil action") in the District Court 
seeking relief from a decree of divorce previously entered 
in Salt Lake County Domestic Relations Action Number D-20185 
(hereinafter "the divorce case"). Consolidated with the 
civil action for trial was Mrs. Christensen's Motion for 
Modification in the divorce case. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following trial on February 14, 15, and 16, 1979, 
Judge Baldwin signed, on April 16, 1979, a Judgment dismissing 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mrs. Christensen's civil action(Civ. R. at 78-79), and~ 
Order in the divorce case denying Mrs. Christensen's motio~ 
for modification (Div. R. at 103-05). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Beverly Kay Christensen respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse Judge Baldwin's denial of 
Mrs. Christensen's Motion for Modification in the divorce 
case and remand the case for further proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties' sixteen and one-half year marriage 
was dissolved by a decree of divorce entered by the Honor-
able Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., on December 19, 1975. (Div. R. 
at 31-38.) That decree was based upon a stipulation reachec 
between the parties (Div. R. at 13-18). 
It was Mrs. Christensen's contention in the civil 
action that the stipulation upon which Judge Hanson's 
decree had been based was the product of misrepresentatw~ 
and fraud practiced upon her by Mr. Christensen. Specific-
ally, Mrs. Christensen contended that Mr. Christensen 
affirmatively misrepresented and concealed from her his true 
financial condition and untruthfully and fraudulently 
represented to her that certain substantial real property 
holdings were, in fact, worthless. (Civ. R. at 9-13.) By 
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her Motion for Modification in the divorce case, 
Mrs. Christensen contended that even if Mr. Christensen's 
conduct complained of in the civil action did not rise to 
the level of actionable fraud, she was, nevertheless, 
entitled to a modification of the original decree based upon 
the apparent change in circumstances manifest by a com-
parison of the resources of Mr. Christensen as assumed to 
exist by the original Stipulation and Decree and those 
resources of Mr. Christensen which actually existed at the 
time. (Div. R. at 90.) 
The property which is the central issue in this 
dispute is an apartment complex known as the Spring Hollow 
Apartments located at 320 Gordon Lane, in Salt Lake County. 
This 52-unit apartment complex was acquired and constructed 
by the parties during the course of their marriage. (Tr. at 
10.) During the negotiations between the parties leading to 
the stipulation upon which the original Decree was based, 
Mrs. Christensen was in the position of having to rely upon 
Mr. Christensen's representations concerning the value and 
extent of their property, since he had never kept her 
apprised of their business affairs (Tr. at 3; 146; 202) and 
she could not afford to retain an appraiser to establish 
values of the property (Tr. at 25-26). 
-3-
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Mrs. Christensen testified that Mr. Christense11 
represented to her that the apartment complex was without 
any value since it had cost nearly twice as much to build as 
anticipated, the mortgage obligation was at least equal to 
its value at the time, and the rents were barely sufficient 
to service the mortgage obligation. (Tr. at 7.) It is 
undisputed that in December, 1975, when the Decree was 
entered, the mortgage obligation owed on the apartment 
complex was approximately $368,000. (Tr. at 67.) While 
Mr. Christensen denied in his testimony that he stated 
to Mrs. Christensen that the complex had no value, he 
admitted that he told her that the gross value of the 
apartment complex was only $460,000 (Tr. at 59), which 
would indicate an equity of only $100,000. 
While '1r. Christensen adrni tted telling his wife in 
December that the apartment complex was worth only $460,000, 
less than a month earlier he had certified in a financial 
statement that the apartment complex had a fair market value 
of $710,000. (Exhibits 8-P and 9-P.) Thus, less than a 
month before he told his wife either (her testimony) that 
the apartment complex was worthless or (his testimony) that 
it had a net equity of $100,000, he had admitted in a 
f . ket value financial statement that the complex had a air mar 
-4-
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of almost three-quarters of a million dollars, which would 
indicate a net equity of $342,000--three and a half times 
what he told his wife it was worth, even under his version 
of the facts. Moreover, within five months after Mr. Chris-
tensen admittedly represented to his wife that the complex 
was worth, at most, $460,000, he listed the property for 
sale at $950,000 (Tr. at 188), and rejected an offer to 
purchase the property for $900,000 with a $150,000 cash down 
payment (Tr. at 71; Exhibit 23-D). 
It was the uncontradicted opinion of Mrs. Chris-
tensen's expert witnesses that the apartment complex was 
actually worth between $750,000 and $825,000 in December, 
1975. (Tr. at 109-10.) 
Upon learning of the discrepency between the 
actual values of the property and those values attributed to 
the property by Mr. Christensen, Mrs. Christensen attempted 
to modify the original decree through an Order to Show Cause 
filed on August 12, 1976. On November 18, 1976, however, 
the Honorable Dean E. Conder ruled that since Mrs. Christensen 
sought to modify the original decree on the basis of fraud 
discovered more than three months after its entry, her only 
recourse was through an independent fraud action. (Div. R. 
at 60.) Thereafter, Mrs. Christensen filed the civil action 
-5-
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presently before this Court, which was later consolidated 
with her motion for modification filed in the original 
divorce case (Div. R. at 90). 
Prior to trial, Mrs. Christensen's attorney 
entered into an agreement with Walter R. Ellett, the 
attorney representing Mr. Christensen, to the effect that 
Mr. Christensen and his accountant would produce in court 
all «books and records and check records sufficient to 
demonstrate [Mr. Christensen's] income production" fortne 
year 1978. (Exhibit 24-P.) Notwithstanding the failure of 
both Mr. Christensen and his accountant to produce a single 
record relating in any manner to the year 197 8 (Tr. at 1511, 
Mr. Christensen was permitted to testify in conclusory a~ 
summary fashion as to his speculations and conjectures as to 
his income and expenses for that year (Tr. at 222-25). fu. 
Christensen admitted that while these records existed, he 
had not bothered to bring them with him. (Tr. at 234-35.) 
Judge Baldwin was unable to see the "materiality" of either 
the agreement reached or the defendant's blatant disregard 
of it (Tr. at 234), and summarily rejected the proffer made 
by Mrs. Christensen's counsel (Tr. at 244-45). As a result, 
no meaningful evidence was adduced as to Mr. Christensen' 5 
1978 income, expenses, or property holdings. 
-6-
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT A 
MODIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL DECREE. 
It appears without question from the record that 
Mr. Christensen represented to his wife that the apartment 
complex was worth at most $460,000, although only one month 
earlier he had certified that it was worth at least $710,000 
and five months later he listed the property for sale at 
$950,000 and rejected an offer to purchase the property for 
$900,000 with a $150,000 cash down payment. The uncontra-
dicted record also indicates that the property actually had 
a value of $750,000 to $825,000 in December, 1975. Even if 
the trial court was justified under these circumstances in 
finding that Mr. Christensen's conduct was not fraudulent, 
the court was not justified in its denial of Mrs. Christen-
sen's motion for modification of the original property 
distribution. 
If, as the trial court apparently believed, the 
assumption by Mrs. Christensen, her former attorney, and the 
original divorce court that the property had an equity of at 
most $100,000 was the result of non-fraudulent, innocent 
errors or misapprehensions on the part of Mr. Christensen, 
it was nevertheless clear that the stipulation between Mr. 
and Mrs. Christensen was grossly inaccurate and had been 
-7-
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relied upon by the original divorce court in distributing 
their property. When a comparison is drawn between the 
value of the apartment complex as assumed by the original 
divorce court (an equity of at most $100,000) and the actual 
value of the property at that time (an equity of between 
$400,000 and $500,000), a discrepancy in excess of one 
quarter million dollars is revealed. 
Due to this discrepancy, there is an apparent (ii 
not an actual) increase in Mr. Christensen's financial 
resources when a comparison is drawn between Mr. Christen-
sen' s resources as assumed to exist by the original divorce 
court and his actual resources. The trial court should have 
granted Mrs. Christensen's motion for a modification of the 
original decree based upon this apparent increase. 
This Court has recognized and endorsed such a 
procedure. For example, in Kess inakis v. Kessinakis, 546 
P.2 888 (Utah 1976), the factual situation was analytically 
identical with that present in these cases. The wife, u 
plaintiff, had been granted an uncontested divorce. Alleg-
ing that the decree had been based upon misrepresentations 
made by his wife as to the extent of his economic resources, 
· a· f the the husband moved the trial court to set aside or mo 1 Y 
decree. As in this case, the motion was made more than 90 
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days following the entry of the original decree. While this 
court held that the decree could not be set aside on the 
basis of the alleged misrepresentations, it was careful to 
demonstrate that the party aggrieved by the misrepresentations 
to the trial court was not without a means of obtaining 
relief, noting that the victim of the alleged misrepresent-
ations was 
not helpless. He may petition the 
trial court for modification of the 
terms of the decree, if there is a 
change of circumstances. While his 
actual earnings may now be the same 
as they were at the time of the 
divorce proceeding, neither party 
can at this late day, dispute the 
findings made by the court at the 
hearing. If [the husband's] earn-
ings and wealth are now less than 
what the court found them to be, 
there is a change of circumstances 
which would justify a consideration 
by the court of the need to modify 
the original decree. 
546 P.2d at 889 (emphasis added). Likewise in this case, 
Mr. Christensen as well as ~s. Christensen is bound by 
the representations made to and the assumptions drawn 
by the original divorce court as to the marital assets 
of the parties. comparison of the total amount of these 
assets as assumed to exist by the original divorce court 
with the actual amount of those assets as proved in the 
recent proceedings before the trial court, demonstrates 
-9-
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that the actual value of the assets far exceeded the value 
assumed by both Mrs. Christensen and the original divorce 
court. 
Under the principles enunciated by this court in 
Kessinakis, the distribution of the original decree should 
be modified in recognition of the greater value clearly 
proven at the recent hearing. Such a modification is 
necessary both to provide Mrs. Christensen with a reasonable 
and equitable share of the marital assets and to prevent /1r. 
Christensen from unjustly profiting from his highly quest~~ 
able conduct. 
Al though modi f ica ti on of a divorce decree based 
upon a change in circumstances more frequently relates to 
the alimony or child support, it is clear under the statutes 
of this state, and the decisions of this Court interpreting 
those statutes, that similar modification of the property 
distribution is appropriate. Section 30-3-5, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended), expressly states, in pertinent 
part, that: 
The court shall have continuing 
jurisdiction to make such sub-
sequent changes or new orders 
with respect to . the dis-
tribution of property as shall 
be reasonable and necessary. 
Interpreting this statute, this Court has held: 
-10-
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[U)nder our statutes, the court 
retains jurisdiction of the parties 
to modify the decree with respect 
to the distribution of property. 
Bott v. Bott, 20 Utah 2d 329, 437 P.2d 684 at 685 (1968) 
(citations omitted). 
In Larsen v. Daynes, 102 Utah 312, 133 P.2d 785 
(1943) , this Court expressly relied upon Section 30-3-5 in 
granting a subsequent modification of a property distribution. 
For almost 100 years, since its decision in 
Whitmore v. Harden, 3 Utah 121, 1 Pac. 465 (1882), this 
Court has recognized the propriety of subsequent modifi-
cation as to the property distribution as well as to the 
alimony and child support provisions of divorce decrees. 
Accordingly, even if the trial court was justified 
in finding that ~r. Christensen's conduct did not constitute 
fraud, the trial court was clearly not justified in denying 
modification of the original decree. Even if the value of 
Mr. Christensen's property holdings has not increased since 
the entry of the original decree, there appears to have been 
an increase in the value of those holdings when the value 
which Mr. Christensen admits he placed upon those holdings--
which value must have been relied upon not only by Mrs. 
Christensen but also by the original divorce court--is 
compared with the true and actual value of the Christensens' 
property. 
-11-
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Under this Court's holding in Kessinakis, such an apparent 
change in circumstances was sufficient grounds for modifi-
cation of the original property distribution. The trial 
court's refusal to grant such a modification constitutes 
clear error and should be reversed. 
II. IN VIEW OF MR. CHRISTENSEN'S WILLFUL FAILURE 
TO PRODUCE HIS FINANCIAL RECORDS AS AGREED, THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN PERMITTING HIS SELF-SERVING TESTIMONY AS TO HIS 
1978 INCOME AND EXPENSES. 
Mr. Christensen, through his counsel Walter R. 
Ellett, agreed that he would produce in court at the trial 
all of his "books and records and check records sufficient 
to demonstrate [his] income production" for 1978, without 
the necessity of Subpoenas Duces Tecum being served upon h1rn 
and his accountant. While Mr. Christensen admitted the 
existence of these documents (Tr. at 234-35), he willful~ 
failed to produce them in court. Notwithstanding Mr. Chris· 
tensen's failure to produce these key documents, the u~l 
court permitted him to testify to his conclusions and 
conjectures as to his 1978 income and expenses, over Mrs. 
Christensen's repeated objections. (Tr. at 222; 223; 22 4.I 
Moreover, the trial court denied Mrs. Christensen's motion 
-12-
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to strike this self-serving and unsupported testimony. (Tr. 
at 235.) 
As a result of Mr. Christensen's willful failure 
to produce his records, the trial court's ruling, and Mrs. 
Christensen's reliance upon the good faith of attorney 
Ellett, she was effectively precluded from all opportunity 
of establishing the significant changes in Mr. Christensen's 
financial circumstances upon which a modification of the 
alimony provisions of the original decree might have been 
based. It is, therefore, appropriate that this Court remand 
this case to the trial court so as to permit Mrs. Christen-
sen a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate Mr. Christensen's 
increased financial capabilities. 
As this court noted in Stevens v. Gray, 123 Utah 
395, 259 P.2d 889 (1953), it is only under extremely unusual 
circumstances, explained to the trial court's complete 
satisfaction, that a party should be permitted to testify as 
to matters contained within records which have not them-
selves been produced. In that case, which was an action 
between two partners for an accounting, one of the partners 
claimed various credits and offsets for feed and wages 
allegedly expended on behalf of the partnership's affairs; 
however, he failed to produce at trial any of the records 
-13-
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supporting his claims, merely testifying, i lf 
n a se -serving 
fashion as did Mr. Christensen, as to the amounts which he 
claimed were due and owing to him. This Court noted that 
where 
records should have been kept, and 
are not produced, the court should 
look with extreme caution upon 
such secondary evidence [as the 
party's own unsupported testimony]. 
259 P.2d at 891. This Court then held that the party's 
unsubstantiated testimony was so unconvincing that it was 
error for the trial court to have relied upon it; accord-
ingly, the trial court's finding based upon the party's 
unsupported testimony was reversed. 
In this case, due to Mr. Christensen's willful 
disregard of the agreement that his attorney had assured 
Mrs. Christensen's counsel would be honored, there was no 
evidence, aside from Mr. Christensen's own unsupported, 
self-serving testimony, relating to his 1978 income and 
expenses. Without such testimony, it was impossible for the 
trial court to render any meaningful determination as to 
whether or not a change had occurred in Mr. Christensen's 
income capabilities. Absent such a determination,. the trial 
court's denial of Mrs. Christensen's motion for modification 
cannot be supported. The case should, therefore, be remandea 
-14-
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to the trial court so as to permit Mrs. Christensen a 
reasonable opportunity to produce evidence of Mr. Chris-
tensen's increased financial capabilities. 
CONCLUSION 
Even assuming the trial court to have been justified 
in determining that Mr. Christensen's representations 
concerning the value of the parties' apartment complex were 
not fraudulent, it was error for the trial court to refuse 
to order a modification of the original decree, which was 
based upon conceded representations by Mr. Christensen that 
the apartment complex was worth at least a quarter million 
dollars less than its actual value. This Court has consist-
ently construed the statues of this state to permit modifi-
cation of the property distribution. Moreover, this Court 
has held that where the original decree is based upon an 
assumption of the trial court which is later demonstrated to 
have been erroneous, there is an apparent (even if not an 
actual) change in circumstance. This apparent change in 
circumstance has been held to be sufficient to require 
modification of the original property distribution. In this 
case, the record makes clear that, even under the version of 
the facts recited by Mr. Christensen, he under-valued the 
parties' apartment complex by at least $250,000. Accordingly, 
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there is an apparent increase of some $250,000 when the 
value of the apartment complex as assumed by the trial 
court and the Christensens at the time the original 
decree is compared with the actual value of the apartment 
complex. The trial court's refusal to order a modification 
of the property distribution based upon this apparent 
change in circumstances was clearly erroneous. 
Additionally, Mrs. Christensen's efforts to 
demonstrate that Mr. Christensen's income had increased 
significantly since the original decree were thwarted 
by Mr. Christensen's willful failure to carry through 
with the agreement reached between his counsel and 
Mrs. Christensen's. The trial court erred in permitting 
Mr. Christensen's self-serving and conclusory testimony 
as to his 1978 income and expenses in light of the fact 
that he had willfully failed to abide by the agreement 
reached with Mrs. Christensen's counsel. As a result of 
Mr. Christensen's conduct and the errors of the trial 
court, Mrs. Christensen has been deprived of any reason-
able opportunity to establish on the record Mr. Christen-
sen's significant increase in annual income since the 
original decree. Accordingly, this case should be 
remanded to the trial court so as to permit Mrs. Christensen 
-16-
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a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate Mr. Christensen's 
increased income. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of November, 
1979. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the 
foregoing Brief to Walter R. Ellett, 5085 South State, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84107, this 23rd day of November, 1979. 
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